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The States has neither a robust or "strong" legal pluralism, which would treat state and non-state (religious) entities as authorities sharing coequal jurisdiction and power, nor a "state-law pluralism," which would delegate family-law matters to religious courts! Instead, U.S. courts often use the technique Maleiha Malik describes as "severance; in which they "consider issues on a case-by-case basis and distinguish between those of the minority legal order's norms that cai:i be accommodated.
without compromising liberal constitutional principles from those that must be rejected or prohib!ted." 3 Family law in the United States, I will argue, embraces a mild legal pluralism while clearly distinguishing between civil and religious marriage. As an entry point, I discuss the ongoing debate over whether civil family law should permit same-sex couples to marry. I then consider two categories of cases: (1) cases in which courts consider whether to enforce terms of religious marriage contracts, divorce agreements, or arbitration agreements, and (i.) cases in which courts decide whether the principle of.comity requires them to recognize foreign marriages and· judgments of divorce. These cases highlight that U.S. family law generally accommodates religious pluralism, subject to constitutibnai norms and public policy. This chapter then argues that the recent enactment of state bans on the application of foreign law (so-called anti-sharia laws) reflects a misunderstanding-if not rejection-of this mild legal pluralism. T4ese laws reflect an evident concern that .there is a fundamental clash between the U.S. Constitution and sharia, and that, without such bans, courts will be on a slippery slope toward establishing a theocratic code that would replace the U.S. Constitution. 4 Concei;n,s over the equality of women in matters of family law feature calls for such bans. That concern is acute with respect to a third category of cases involving religion and the law: attempts to assert religious beliefs about family roles as a defense against public laws prohibiting domestic violence and sexual assault. Such appeals to religion or culture will not trump the protective policies of civil and criminal law. Through all of these examples, this chapter argues that legal pluralism in U.S. family law is appropriately mild rather than robust because such pluralism is within the frame of U.S. constitutional law and the commitments of family law.
WHA,T IS LEGAL PLURALISM?
A broad understanding of legal pluralism would include the multiple sources of normative ordering in a society, not simply the "official" legal syst~m found in cases, statutes, constitutions, administrative regulations, and the like, but also "unofficial" sources oflaw, such as religious regulation of marriage and \iivorce, rules, and customs. 5 Unofficial family law may have a formative effect on persons, families, and communities, eveJ.1 if it lacks the imprimatur of binding civil or state authority. 6 The definition of legal pluralism that I use in this chapter distinguishes this normative pluralism-that people recognize an.cl adhere to many sources of norms "other than those of the state's laws" 7 -from a narrower focus on that imprimatur of civil and state authority, given that "state law" is "fundamentally different" tha11 non-state forms of ordering because "it exercises the coercive power of the state and monopolizes the sy:mbolic p9wer associated with state· authority." 8 Family law in the United States embraces a mild form oflegal pluralism when U.S. courts "give official, or civil effect to certain aspects of religious family law." 9 Such pluralism is appropriately constrained not only by "our fundaf!\ental 'political and, constitutional values;" such as equality, 11ondiscrimination, due process, and religious freedom, but also by "'the protective policies that form the foundation for our That U.S. family law permits solemnization of marriage in a religious ceremony to create a valid civil marriage suggests a mild form oflegal pluralism. By incorporating "unofficial law and norms into the civil rite, the state appropriates and reinforces the solemnity of the occasion for its own purposes;' such as impressing "the couples and the community with the seriousness of the marriage commitment."' 4 DISTINGUISHING CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS MARRIAGE:
THE EXAMPLE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE That religious officials may perform marriages with civil effects reflects U.S. family law's roots in early English marriage law, when marriage "was the exclusive concern of ecclesiastical courts and the canon law:'•s Civil family law bears the traces of these ecclesiastical origins, but "in America marriage has always been regulated by the civil law," with "many state statutes" explicitly "providing that marriage is a civil contract." 16 The state, in effect, is a third party to every marriage contract.
The ongoing battle over access by same-sex couples to civil marriage reveals the significance of the distinction between civil and religious marriage. As the Mas- The second category of cases involves the doctrine of comity; that is, whether a court will recognize,--,,-or refuse to recognize-a foreign marriage, divorce, or court order, which may also be based on religious family law. Given that individuals often cross national borders, marrying in one nation and· divorcing in another, or engage in forum shopping to obtain more favorable terms in a religious or foreign forum, these cases may be complex.
A significant issue this body oflaw raises, as I elaborate elsewhere, is "how civil family law's concerns for procedural and.substantive fairness shape the accommodation now afforded to religious law." For example, "religious family law often has gender asymmetries in the rights and duties of husbands and wives (including the power to initiate a divorce)-and of fathers and mothers," and "rules concerning the economic consequences of marriage and divorce" in certain religious traditions "differ from the economic partnerships model of civil family law:' 17 Given the trend in family law toward private ordering, should a Muslim woman's agreement to forego economic sharing of property upon divorce because it is "un-Islamic; for instance, warrant closer scrutiny for voluntariness and fairness than a non-Muslim woman's agreement to do so because her more affiuent spouse insists upon it as a precondition for marriage ?' to allow it to "advise and counsel" them concerning their marriage.2 9 An aim of such arbitration clauses is to help the wife secure from her husband a get, a formal document of divorce, so that she is free to remarry and not be an agunah, a woman chained to her marriage. 30 In Odatalla v. Odatalla, 3 ' a New Jersey court similarly relied on the "neutral principles" approach to reject a husband's argument that enforcing a mahr agree" ment, entered into during an Islamic marriage ceremony, to pay his wife $10,000
in postponed dowry would "violate the separation of church and state." Using principles of contract law, the court held that the agreement was not too vague to be enforced, finding persuasive the wife's testimony about when payment could be demanded.
Courts have also upheld agreements by parties who are divorcing civilly to.reli- On appeal, the appellate court cited Odatalla as a "helpful framework;' indicating there was no First Amendment problem. By contrast to Odatalla, however, it concluded the mahr agreement was "invalid" under Washington's rules about the.formation and validity of contracts because there was "no meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the agreement," such as "why or when the $20,000 would be paid." 37 Also, the husband learned of the mahr fifteen minutes before he signed it and had no opportunity to consult with legal counsel. His uncle conducted the negotiations in Farsi, a language unknown to the husband,·and advised him after he signed the agreement. The reviewing court noted the trial court's.conclusion that "the agreement was influenced by duress," due to "a lot of pressure from both families." 38 On the one hand, this ruling is consistent with case law holding premarital and marital agreements unenforceable when circumstances indicate consent was not informed or voluntary (such as being presented with an agreement shortly before the wedding guests arrive). On the other hand, "in this cultural context, ... different expectations probably apply;' as the husband, in adopting "a wedding format customary in his (Afghani) culture;' would have "anticipated that the nikah included a mahr:' 39 
CASES INVOLVING COMITY
A second category of cases involve whether, applying the doctrine of comity, a court will recognize foreign marriage contracts or divorce judgments (wnich may be based on religious law). One instructive example is Aleem v. Aleem, where a Maryland appellate court upheld a lower court's ruling that it need not give comity to a Pakistani talaq divorce (where the husband pronounced three times that he was divorcing his wife) and was not barred from ordering that the wife receive equitable distribution ofher husband's pension. 40 Maryland's highest court subsequently affirmed, stating that talaq divorce, where "only the male, i.e., husband, has an independent right to utilize talaq and the wife may utilize it only with the husband's permission, is contrary to Maryland's constitutional provisions and ... to the public policy ofMaryland." 4 '
Aleem also illustrates judicial concern about strategic forum shopping that defeats the protective purposes of a state's family law. When the wife initiated a civil divorce, the couple had never lived together in Pakistan, but .had lived in Maryland more than twenty years ·and reared two children, both U.S. citizens Similarly unsuccessful was the husband's policy argument that "the laws of the UAE are based upon Sharia law." In notable contrast to the fears of "sharia law" shown by some courts and state legislatures (as I discuss later), the New York court reasoned that, while "parts of Sharia Law governing personal status would indeed violate our domestic policy, such as laws allowing husbands to practice polygyny and use of physical force to discipline their wives;' "none of the principles used by the Abu Dhabi courts in the parties' divorce action" to "determine the financial issues" .between them violated.New York's· public policy. 12 Recognizing the foreign judgment that the defendant pay the wife "a distributive award" of $~,so,ooo based on the mahr agreement, the court invoked Avitzur to conclude that the agreement, entered into after the civil marriage ceremony (in New York), was a "post marital" or "aritenuptial" contract obligation, enforceable "according to neutral principles oflaw" provided it did not violate state law or public policy. 11 Fundamental principles of comity, the court concluded, supported enforcing the judgment: It was "rendered under a system of justice compatible with due process of law," and there was no evidence it was "procured through fraud" or that enforcing it "would be repugnant to the public policy of this state or of noti<?ns of fairness. Solemaini reflects an unwarranted fear of "too much pluralism" in family law.
In dramatic terms, the court perceived a clash in values between two legal regimes:
"the protection of Kansas law ... requires an equitable division of property in a secular system that is not controlled by the dictates or religious authorities or even a society dominated by men who place values on women in medieval .terms." 17 A striking aspect of the opinion is that the court shows some basic understanding of Islamic family law, but the gender asymmetries of that law function as reasons not to enforce the mahr agreement. The court observed that because Islamic law, like "traditional Jewish law," allows men "to unilaterally .declare a divorce," the mahr is "a means of tempering the inequities of traditional religious law" and may be "culturally justified." 18 However, the fact that "wives have no right to pronounce the talaq" violates the Equal Protection Clause requirement that the law not treat persons differently based on "arbitrary or invidious" distinctions. The case before it, however, did not involve a talaq divorce; nonetheless, it noted that Michigan state courts declined to give comity to foreign talaq divorces because those legal systems deny equal protection under Michigan's laws. 59 The Kansas court expressed concern over abdicating its "overall constitutional The court cited Kansas's ban to fortify its concern about upholding religious law that arbitrarily discrimjnates against wives, 6 ' but refused to enforce a wife's right.to the deferred portion of the mahr ($677,0000 at divorce) because it would impose an exorbitant economic penalty on her husband. The court accepted.the husband's argument that the mahr offended public policy because "it would interfere with the Court's ability to make a just and equitable division [of property] under Kansas law," without regard to fault. 61 The court also cited to California cases ruling that terms in Jewish and Islamic religious marriage contracts that provided the wife a substantial payment of money or half of the husband's property in the event of divorce offended public policy because they encouraged divorce. 6 ' Once again, the Kansas court shows some understanding oflslamic family law, citing scholarly sources, but refuses to engage in a careful, contextual evaluation of whether enforcing the mahr would violate public policy. Thus, it observes that, "In Islamic tradition, each spouse retains their own.assets as separate property during the marriage, and so marital or community property is foreign to Islam." Mahr negotiations, thus, by contrast to premarital agreements, "do not> represent an attempt to bargain around default divorce laws." It then casts doubt on whether the "neutral principles oflaw" approach is realistic, given the "'Islamic shadow behind which husband and wife'" negotiate the mahr; frequently, they did so in home countries without U.S. family law's default rules and did not "anticipate litigation in American courts and confronting state equitable division or community property laws." 6 • However accurate this description may be.of the reasonable expectations of Muslims unfamiliar with U.S. law, it hardly describes Mr. Soleimani. He lefi:
Iran for the United States in I977, became a· naturalized U.S. citizen, and was quite familiar with Kansas's law of equitable distribution as, when he "divorced his first wife of 30 years in a Kansas civil proceeding, they both received.marital property! Moreover, subsequent to the Iranian marriage ceremony, he married his second wife civilly and reside_d with her in Kansas. 61 who warn that Islamic extremists seek to supplant U.S. constitutional and state law-=-:particularly, family law-with sharia, with dire consequences, particularly for women. 70 These laws "grossly mischaracterize-both the meaning and practice of Sharia," including the "diversity of interpretation oflslam." 71 In effect, they reject the legal pluralism present in U.S. family law while failing to understand that the U.S. Constitution and family law already limit the application by judges in the U.S.
legal system of religious and foreign law. One spur for bans on sharia was a New Jersey court judge's highly publicized Eventually, the husband verbally divorced his wife, who obtained a temporary restraining order against him. The trial court found that she proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant engaged in ~harassment" (based on "clear proof" of nonconsensual sex) and "assault;' but ruled· that even though the defendant "had engaged in sexual relations with plaintiff against her expressed.
wishes" on at least two occasions, he lacked a "criminal desire to or intent to sexually assault" because he believed his conduct was not prohibited by his religion.
The trial court, for example, cited the imam's testimony that under Islamic law, "a wife must comply with her husband's sexual demands:' However, while the imam "did not definitely answer whether, under Islamic. law, a husband must stop his advances if his wife said 'no;" he "acknowledged that New Jersey law considered coerced sex between married people to be rape." 8 9 On appeal, the reviewing court reversed and sharply reprimanded the trial The appellate court also ruled that the trial court erred in not issuing the wife a final re~training order against the husband, on the rationale that the parties had undergone a "bad patch" in their marriage, but her injuries were "not severe" and,
, after divorce, a restraining order was "not necessary to prevent another act of domestic violence." However, because the plaintiff was pregnant, the judge conceded the parties would need to be in some contact. 94 The appellate court stated that under New Jersey's domestic violence statute, courts have an obligation to "protect victims of violence that occurs in a family." It expressed concern that the trial judge's "view of the facts ... may have been colored by his perception that, although defendant's sexual acts violated applicable criminal statues, they were culturally acceptable and thus not actionable-a view we have soundly rejected." 95
The "strong reprimand" delivered by the New Jersey appellate court and its message that public policy trumps the appeal to (foreign) religious belief should "prove that the American justice system works" and that foreign-law bans are unnecessary. 96 As one attorney commented on the case: "foreign law or religious law in America is considered within American constitutional strictures." He added that while a minority of Mqslims mistakenly hold a co11trary belie£ "the appellate ruling is consistent with Islamic law, which prohibits spousal abuse. 
